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I. INTRODUCTION
The childhood saying implying that words will never hurt you
has little meaning in the health care peer review arena. In fact, one
derogatory or critical statement by a fellow physician could bring
a medical career to a screeching halt. This is often the result because
most hospitals have regulations requiring physicians to undergo a
peer review process in order to receive or retain the privilege of
using hospital facilities. The process itself is based upon the idea of
self-regulation in that hospital physicians are asked to review and
evaluate the performance of their co-workers and to restrict or deny
various hospital privileges if necessary.
This peer review process can best be understood if it is first
realized that in most cases doctors with hospital privileges are not
employees of the hospital, but rather independent contractors who
must be granted permission to admit patients and make use of the
hospital's resources.' This permission is granted when a physician
receives a vote of approval from his colleagues. "[U]nlike other
forms of peer review, the medical staff privileges system has a direct
1. Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care,
25 Hous. L. REv. 525, 553 (1988).
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coercive sanction to influence behavior: the denial or revocation of
the right of access to facilities essential for an effective medical
practice." 2
Of course, the hospital privileges system is geared towards im-
proving the quality of health care and in this regard there have
recently been some significant changes. On the national level an
increased concern for quality health care is evidenced by the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQUIA)3 and other recent
legislation. 4 The driving force behind this legislation has been a con-
cern for the effects of some recent cuts in funding and compensation
in the health care industry which may negatively impact the quality
of care provided.
However, attempts at improving health care are not unique to
modern medicine. In 2000 B.C. the Code of King Hammurabi of
Babylon required that a doctor who negligently killed a patient have
his hand cut off.5 Our more civilized and sophisticated methods
today require that a doctor face judgment by his peers. The worst
possible punishment today is the denial of privileges based upon a
physician's poor performance, inferior qualifications or disruptive
behavior. These findings can have devastating effects on a physi-
cian's career. In the past, a physician who had lost his privileges
could quietly leave the hospital and seek employment elsewhere. To-
day, however, the possibility of finding gainful employment in the
hospital setting after a poor review is slight due to the provisions
of the HCQUIA. 6 This statute requires that doctors who have been
2. Id. at 554-55.
3. Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 401, 100 Stat. 3784
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-52 (West Supp. 1987)). See generally Colantonio, The Health Care,
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 And Its Impact on Hospital Law, 91 W. VA. L. Ray. 91 (1988).
4. See generally, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203 §§ 4203-
13, 101 Stat. 1330-179 to -219 (codified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1395i, 1395aa, 1396a-1396cc (1989 Supp.));
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 §§ 9351-53, 100 Stat. 1874, 2043-
49 (codified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1320c, 1320c-2, 1320c-3 (1989 Supp.)); Comprehensive Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, §§ 9121, 9401-06, 100 Stat. 82, 164-67, 196, 201
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1302c-2 to -13, 1395 (1987)); and Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 143, 96 Stat. 324, 382 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1302c-1 to
-12 (1982)).
5. Fine & Meyer, Quality Assurance in Historical Perspective, 28 Hosp. & HnTHm SERV.
ADmw., Nov. - Dec. 1983, 94, 94.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (1986).
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denied privileges be reported to a national service which keeps track
of inadequate and poorly qualified physicians. 7 Hospitals must check
with the service before hiring a new physician to make sure that the
physician has not been rejected by other health care facilities and
does not pose a threat to the quality of care provided by the hospital.
Obviously, these requirements can be disastrous to the rejected
physician. Once a doctor has been denied privileges in one hospital,
it is highly unlikely that he will be hired by other accredited hospitals
and medical facilities. The only option for such physicians is to enter
private practice, an alternative which does not offer the substantial
benefits of being associated with an established medical facility. Such
scenarios have prompted increased litigation against the hospitals
and medical staffs which deny privileges to the physicians.
Causes of action brought by physicians against Peer Review
Boards, medical staffs, and hospitals include: violation of medical
staff bylaws, breach of contract, violation of due process and equal
protection, conspiracy, tortious interference with a contractual busi-
ness relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress, anti-
trust claims, and defamation.8 This last claim, defamation, is the
focus of this note. Defamation of character is one of the more usual
claims which has been raised in these suits and such actions have
led to an increased fear of litigation by medical professionals par-
ticipating in the review process. This apprehension has often resulted
in a "code of silence" among the physicians. Although this silence
may protect the physicians from suit, it defeats the primary goal of
increasing the quality of health care.
This note will focus on the effects of the HCQUIA on hospitals,
their medical staffs, and the ability of physicians who have lost or
been denied privileges to seek legal remedies.
II. Tm PEER REVIEW PROCESS
Traditionally, doctors are not entitled to membership on a med-
ical staff of a hospital as a matter of right. 9 "It cannot ... be said
7. Id. at §§ 11131-34.
8. KuCERA & CALLAHAN, Responsibility of Hospital Board of Directors in Peer Review, in
PEER RE IEw AND T LAW, tab 4, at 7-8 (1986).
9. See Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
1990]
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that all licensed physicians have a constitutional right to practice
their profession in a hospital .. "10 Although a license to practice
a profession is a valuable right, deserving of protection by the laws,
it is not afforded the same considerations as a constitutional or
inherent right." However, hospitals cannot arbitrarily deny privi-
leges.12
At public hospitals a physician is either entitled to membership
or to a hearing of the reasons for his refusal. 3 "This right does
not exist, however, in relation to a private hospital, which may, in
its discretion, exclude any physician from its staff without being
required to give any reason therefore.' '1 4 As a general rule, a private
hospital may act at its discretion in deciding whether to grant or
deny medical privileges to a physician and the decision will not be
subject to judicial review.' In fact, a private hospital has an absolute
right to exclude licensed physicians. 6
Peer review is the common method for exercising self regulatory
competence and evaluating physicians for privileges.' 7 "Peer review
can be defined as the evaluation by practicing physicians of the
quality, efficiency and effectiveness of services ordered or performed
by other physicians."' 8 It is the ongoing review of competence
through reappointment, quality assurance and risk management. 9
Essentially, peer review is the credentialling process which assures
that the medical staff is qualified. It applies to both new staff mem-
bers and new privileges of current staff members. 20 "Peer review is
the procedure for evaluation by health care professionals of the qual-
ity and efficiency of services ordered or performed by other health
care professionals .... "'21
10. Id. at 417.
11. Wallington v. Zinn, 146 W. Va. 147, 151, 118 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1961).
12. Singer & Schrier, Initiating the Peer Review Process, PEER REVIEw AND THE LAW, tab 1,
at 3 (1986).
13. State ex rel Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965).
14. Id. at 229, 140 S.E.2d at 457.
15. Pepple v. Parkview Memorial Hosp. Inc., 511 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
16. Sams, 149 W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457.
17. M. BERToLET, HosprrAL Lmrry LAW AND PRAcTicE 41 (5th ed. 1987).
18. W. IsEL, THE HosprrAL MEDIcAL STAi-s-ITs LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIILTIES 126 (1984).
19. Kucm & CAL.AHAN, supra note 8, tab 4, at 5.
20. Id. at 1.
21. W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-1 (1986).
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The 1988 Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH)
Accreditation Manual for Hospitals22 indicated that medical staff
bylaws should set forth the detailed procedures of peer review. By-
laws are the structural framework upon which the medical staff of
the hospital is built. 23 The typical hospital bylaws require a tri-part
organizational structure.Y Overall responsibility rests with the hos-
pital governing body,25 day-to-day operations are the responsibility
of the administrative personnel, 26 and the medical staff is responsible
for the quality of professional services provided. 27 However, the ul-
timate responsibility for the quality of the medical care rests with
the governing body. 28 According to JCAH standards, the governing
body has authority to establish policy, maintain quality care, provide
management planning, and adopt corporate bylaws. 29 It is required
to implement quality assurance programs through the medical staff.30
The hospital must have a well-defined credentialling process; 31 and,
ultimately, the governing body has final responsibility regarding cre-
dentialling decisions. 32
Despite the supreme authority vested in the governing body, the
medical staff itself is considered a separate legal entity distinct from
the hospital corporation and is capable of suing and being sued. 33
It can be held liable for negligence in failing to exercise a reasonable
22. JOINT COMMSSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS ACCREDITATION MAN-
UAL FOR HosPrrALs (1988) [hereinafter JCAH MANUAL].
23. W. ISELE, supra note 18, at 26.
24. MumS & PHmi, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An Overview, 24 DUQ. L. RPv.
489, 500 (1986), reprinted in PEER REvmw AND THE LAW, tab 5, at 3 (1986).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. W. ISELE, supra note 18, at 26.
29. JCAH MANUAL, supra note 22, at 47.
30. KucERA & CALLA1iAN, supra note 8, tab 4, at 3.
31. "The governing body acts on recommendations concerning medical staff appointments,
reappointments, terminations of appointments, and the granting of clinical privileges within a rea-
sonable period of time, as specified in the bylaws of the medical staff." JCAH MANUAL, supra note
22, at 49.
32. "The governing body requires a process or processes designed to assure that all individuals
who provide patient care services, but are not subject to the medical staff privilege delineation process,
are competent to provide such services." Id.
33. W. IsELE, supra note 18, at 4.
1990]
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standard of care in reviewing credentials.3 4 In recognizing the im-
portance of staff members in the general quality of care provided,
a federal court in Wisconsin stated that "members of the medical
staff of a hospital are obviously the key to the quality of the hos-
pital's performance .... [I]n general, members of the medical pro-
fession are the best qualified judges of the professional performance
of other members of the medical profession."" The American Med-
ical Association (AMA) says "the basic concept of peer review is
as old as organized medicine itself,"' 36 and "[t]he process is un-
doubtedly the greatest guardian of the health and well-being of pa-
tients." 37
In order for a hospital to receive JCAH accreditation, it must
show that it has an adequate peer review process to oversee the
quality of patient care.3 8 Not only is peer review a prerequisite for
accreditation by the JCAH, but it is also required by most state
laws. 39 Key factors in accreditation include whether "an organized
governing body or designated person so functioning, is responsible
for establishing policy, maintaining quality patient care, and pro-
viding for institutional management and planning. ' 40 The hospital
governing body usually delegates much of this responsibility to the
medical staff.
Under JCAH standards there must be a "single organized med-
ical staff that has the overall responsibility for the quality of the
professional services provided by the individual with clinical privi-
leges, as well as, the responsibility of accounting therefore to the
governing body."' 41 In addition, there must be an ongoing quality
assurance program which evaluates the quality of patient care. 42
34. Id.
35. Suckle v. Madison General Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196 (1973).
36. M. BERTOLET, supra note 16, at 147.
37. Id.
38. JCAH AccREDL ioN MANUAL FOR HosprrnAs, supra note 22.
39. Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10 Am. J.L. &
MED. 151, 155 (1984).
40. JCAH AccREDIA1ION MANUAL FOR HosprnAts, supra note 21, at 47.
41. Id. at 111.
42. Id. at 235.
[Vol. 92
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss3/7
HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION
Some courts suggest hospitals are run by the medical staff, es-
pecially in regard to peer review. 43 The peer review committees them-
selves are generally made up of attending physicians who meet to
review and evaluate the qualification and practices of their peers.
Typically, they have the power to police peer activities with minimal
interference from administration.
Overall, this process would appear to be a low-risk system for
identifying inadequate caregivers. However, physicians participating
in the review process can experience significant stress resulting from
both the potentially devastating effects their review may have on a
colleague's future and from the fear of involvement in litigation
initiated by dissatisfied or injured patients or rejected physicians.
"Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere
of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a de-
nunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit." 44
These fears are not unfounded as hospitals are increasingly faced
with legal problems involving their medical staffs in the forms of
vicarious or corporate liability. In many cases the hospital is ulti-
mately responsible for the professional conduct of its physicians.45
Darling v. Community Memorial Hosp. ,46 the leading case in this
area, holds hospitals responsible for falling to adequately screen,
supervise, and review the performance of their physicians. Generally,
hospitals are responsible for the negligence of their staff members. 47
Similarly, the theory of corporate negligence is premised on the
hospital's duty of care to the patient. 48 Under the theory of "cor-
porate liability," hospitals have a duty to ensure a reasonable proc-
ess to review and evaluate the qualifications of medical staff
43. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (1984).
44. Brendice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), motion reargued and denied,
51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 IU. 2d 323, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
46. Id.
47. Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 Tam,. L.Q.
552, 559 (1979). See also Jacobs & Weagly, The Myth of Personal Liability From Participation In
Quality Assurance, 14 Buu. Am. C. PHysicNs 662 (1973).
48. Comment, supra note 47, at 559.
1990]
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members. 49 The corporate liability doctrine dictates that the hos-
pital's governing body has the duty to use appropriate measures to
ensure the competency of the medical staff through adequate as-
sessment of competence, identification of deficiencies, and ulti-
mately, proper action on the findings." "A major benefit of
improving health care by rigorous peer review is a reduction of legal
liability for medical malpractice and hospital corporate liability."'
As a result of the increasing liability for hospitals, peer review
organizations5 2 have become essential for protecting the public and
the hospital from the ill effects of incompetent physicians and in-
adequate services.
Often, injured patients attack peer review members for being
negligent in their review and allowing a physician to receive privileges
or continue work at the hospital.5 3 There is a significant area of law
relating to this type of litigation. 54 However, this note will not ad-
dress malpractice-related claims. Instead, the following discussion
relates to the claims of defamation brought by the disgruntled phy-
sicians against the peer review boards.
49. See Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); Singer
& Schnier, supra note 12.
50. LiSET, Conducting The Hearing: Legal Requirements and Practical Solutions, in PEER RE-
viEw AND THE LAW, tab 3, at 1 (1986).
51. Goldberg, supra note 39, at 155.
52. These review organizations include any committee or organization engaging in peer review,
including a hospital utilization review committee, a medical audit committee, a tissue committee, a
credentials committee, or an executive committee for the purposes of evaluating and improving the
quality of health care rendered, reducing morbidity or mortality or establishing and enforcing guide-
lines designed to keep within reasonable bounds the cost of health care. W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-1
(1986).
The purpose of the utilization review committee is to prevent unnecessary utilization of facilities
by Medicare. The actual quality of care at the hospital is reviewed by the medical audit committee
and the quality of surgery is reviewed by the tissue committee. The credentials committee is responsible
for review of the credentials of physicians applying for hospital privileges, while the executive com-
mittee is responsible for quality control by establishing rules that affect the quality of care provided.
MODEL MEDICAL STAFF BYLAws RuLas AND REOut AToNs 197 app. (1964).
53. See Darling, 33 Ill. 2d 323, 211 N.E.2d 253.
54. See, e.g., Lilly v. Turecki, 112 A.D.2d 788, 492 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (action
alleging hospital negligence in treating patients and in granting staff privileges to a physician); Shelton
v. Moorhead Memorial Hosp., 76 N.C. App. 253, 332 S.E.2d 499 (1985) (patient alleged that hospital
officials knew that physicians were incompetent and unfit to practice medicine and had violated
hospital standards of care).
8
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III. DEFAMATION
In order to encourage participation by qualified physicians, peer
review entities receive protection through the special privileges of
confidentiality and immunity from liability. 5 There is a two-step
premise which supports peer review protection: 1) special privileges
result in increased peer review activity, and 2) increased peer review
activity results in health care improvements.5 6 In fact, statutes in
many states provide immunity for physicians on peer review com-
mittees.57 The purpose of this type of legislation is to ensure the
effectiveness of professional self-evaluation in the interest of im-
proving the quality of health care.58
Notwithstanding the special privileges and immunities established
for peer review, members of medical staff review boards have nev-
ertheless been subject to defamation suits by rejected physicians based
upon criticism of the physician's competence or qualifications. 59 "Peer
review is the type of activity in which committee participants are
particularly susceptible to defamation actions, because '[any] process
such as peer review that may result in a conclusion of unfitness for
a profession, communicated to a third party, may result in a def-
amation action.' "60 Defamation law imposes liability for the pub-
lication of false information which injures the reputation of others.6'
Damage to reputation is the basis of a defamation action. 62
55. Comment, supra note 47, at 552.
56. Id.
57. W. IsmEz, supra note 18, at 129. West Virginia is among the states providing protection
for peer review proceedings. Health Care Peer Review Organization Protection, W. VA. CODE § 30-
3C-1 (1986 & 1988 Supp.).
58. Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984).
59. Sibley v. Lutheran Hosp., 871 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1989); DeLeon v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc.,
871 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir. 1989); Ahmed v. Chesapeake Hosp. Auth., 803 F.2d 1180 (4th Cir. 1986);
Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1978); Salaymeh v. St. Vincent Memorial Hosp. Corp.,
706 F. Supp. 643 (C.D. Ill. 1989); Jiricko v. Coffeyville Memorial Hosp. Medical Center, 700 F.
Sapp. 1559 (D. Kan. 1988).
60. Poulin, Peer Review: Accountability & Legal Implications, Occ. HEALTH NURsN O, Dec.
1977, at 14, 17.
61. Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 198, 445 A.2d 376, 383, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 907 (1982).
62. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1982) (citing New
York law).
1990]
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"The concept that a person's reputation in the community is
precious and should not be injured with impunity had been well
established since ancient times. ' 63 In very early English canon law,
the only remedy for a complaint resembling defamation was a public
apology. 64 This method of clearing one's good name provided some
legal protection. 65 However, it was not until the latter part of the
16th century that a remedy was recognized by common law. 66
Defamation includes communications which tend to injure one's
occupation. 67 It occurs when a communication "tends to so harm
the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him." ' 6 Obviously, a rejection of privileges by a peer review
could have the requisite damaging effects.
A person's standing in the community with his friends, neighbors and prospective
acquaintances is of great value and he is entitled to have his relations with them
unimpaired by defamatory harms. The regard of those about him more completely
conditions his behavior than any other one factor, and it likewise adds more to
his stature as a person than any other one factor. This interest has long been
identified and valued as reputation . . ..
It has been said that a good reputation is the most precious
possession a man can have. 70 "[T]he right of the private citizen to
secure his reputation always must remain one of the most sacred of
rights." ' 71 This right is also protected in the West Virginia
63. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 76 (W. Va. 1984).
64. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAmATioN 4 (1978).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 48 (1980), (quoting Madison v. Yunker,
180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978) (quoting Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 162 Mont. 401, 512
P.2d 702 (1973)). Cf. Ceravolo v. Brown, 364 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Ala. 1978).
68. REpsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976). Defamation is "that which tends to injure
'reputation' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which
the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him."
W. KEroN, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 111 at 773 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
69. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 64, at 12 (quoting GREEN, MALONE, PEDRICK & RAn., INJURIES
TO RELATIONS 332 (1959)).
70. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 64, at 13 n.40 (quoting Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217 N.C.
13, 20, 6 S.E.2d 882, 887 (1940)).
71. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 64, at 13 n.40 (quoting Sweet v. Post Pub. Co., 215 Mass. 450,
455, 102 N.E. 660, 662 (1913)).
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constitution72 by a provision which establishes that every person shall
have remedy by law for injury to his person, property, or repu-
tation.73 In West Virginia, the essential elements of a defamation
claim include: 1) defamatory statements, 2) non-privileged com-
munication to a third party, 3) falsity, 4) reference to the plaintiff,
5) negligence on the part of the publisher, and 6) resulting injury.74
Normally, there are two types of defenses available in defamation
actions-i) truth and 2) privilege. 75 Truth is recognized as a complete
defense. 76 "In any action for defamation, the defendant may justify
by alleging and proving that the words spoken or written were true
.... 277 Although the West Virginia Supreme Court has not decided
the issue of "substantial truth" 78 as a defense in civil libel actions,
a district court opinion predicted that "substantial truth" would
constitute an absolute defense in common law defamation actions
brought by private persons against non-media defendants in West
Virginia. 79
There are also two types of privileges available to defamation
defendants.8 0 An absolute privilege precludes defamation actions,
72. W. VA. CONST. art. III § 17.
73. Id. In addition, for defamation causes of action, West Virginia has an "insulting words"
statute which provides that "all words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation,
are construed as insults and tend to violence and breach of the peace, shall be actionable." W. VA.
CODE § 55-7-2 (1981).
74. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 77.
Defamatory speech is not actionable unless there is fault on the part of the speaker. Bainhauer
v. Manoukian, 215 N.J. Super. 9, 31, 520 A.2d 1154, 1166 (1987) (citing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
The "U.S. Supreme Court has, by implication, allocated an issue of falsity to the plaintiff by
holding that the plaintiff has no cause of action unless he established the defendant's fault." C.
MORRIS, MODERN DEr~mA ioN LAW 24 (1978).
Public officials must establish malice. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967). And, private persons must establish at least negligence. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
75. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 77.
76. "In ... civil suits for libel, the truth may be given in evidence; and if it shall appear to
the jury, that the matter charged as libelous, is true, and was published with good motives, and for
justifiable ends, the verdict shall be for the defendant." W. VA. CONST. art. III § 8.
77. W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (1986).
78. "[I]t is now generally agreed that it is not necessary to prove the literal truth of the ac-
cusation in every detail, and that it is sufficient to show that the imputation is substantially true ......
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 68, § 116, at 842 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
79. Kinney v. Daniels, 574 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. W. Va. 1983).
80. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 77.
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whereas a qualified privilege may be defeated. 8' An absolutely priv-
ileged communication has been defined by the West Virginia courts
as one for which no remedy can be had in a civil action, regardless
of the effect on the person who claims to be injured, even though
it may have been made maliciously.8 2 Such a privilege "is limited
to those situations where there is an obvious policy in favor of
permitting complete freedom of expression without any inquiry as
to the defendant's motives.' '83 Absolute privileges are usually limited
to legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial proceedings and other state
actions. 84 Not surprisingly, it has been held that hospital peer review
committees do not qualify as quasi-judicial proceedings. 85
Qualified privileges are more relevant to the peer review process.
"Qualified privileges are based upon a public policy that it is es-
sential that true information be given whenever it is reasonably nec-
essary for the protection of one's own interests, the interests of third
persons or certain interests of the public." 8 6 Such privileges exist
when statements are made in good faith regarding a subject matter
in which the publisher has an interest or duty and the statements
are limited to persons who have a legitimate interest in the matter.8 7
The essential elements of a conditional or qualified privilege include:
good faith, public policy, an interest in the subject matter, proper
occasion, and publication in a proper manner to proper parties. 88
A communication is qualifiedly privileged where it is fairly made
by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty upon
81. Id.
82. Id. at 78 (quoting City of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557, 563, 57 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1949)
(quoting 33 Am. JuR., Libel and Slander § 125 (1941)).
83. Id. at 77.
84. Id. at 78. See, e.g., Parker v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 126 W. Va. 666, 672, 30
S.E.2d 1, 4 (1944).
85. A minority of states have established an absolute privilege based upon the theory that the
peer review process is a quasi-judicial proceeding. Dimiceli v. Klieger, 58 Wis. 2d 359, 206 N.W.2d
184 (1973). In fact, one jurisdiction has gone so far as to declare that "peer review is a complete
defense to an action for defamation." Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985).
86. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 77.
87. Id.
88. Mayfield v. Gleichert, 484 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). The question of whether
a privilege exists is a question of law for the court. Id. at 626; Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 81. Once a
privilege is established, however, abuse of the privilege must be considered by the jury as a question
of fact. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 81.
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any subject matter in which that person has an interest, and where
it is made to a person with a corresponding interest or duty.89 Re-
marks made during the peer review process meet this definition of
a qualifiedly privileged communication because they involve state-
ments made by hospital officials about matters of concern to the
hospital and the statements are made pursuant to a duty to inform
persons with an interest in the matter. Therefore, it is proper that
such reviews are protected by these legal privileges.
However, "[d] efamatory statements, motivated by ill-will or mal-
ice, have no place in a forum convened to determine the qualifi-
cations of an individual to continue in the practice of his
profession.' ' 9 In recognition of that principle, qualified privileges
do not provide absolute immunity, but merely negate the presump-
tion of malice and place the burden of proof on the plaintiff. 91
Therefore, in cases where the plaintiff physician is able to prove
that the remarks were made with malice, he may prevail in a def-
amation suit. 92
Generally courts have recognized that medical staff peer review
boards are assisting the hospital in meeting its credentialling and
quality assurance requirements. Therefore, such boards gain the pro-
tection of immunity and are insulated from personal liability because
they are acting under the authority of the hospital. 93 The immunity
available in these cases usually takes the form of a qualified priv-
89. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 68, § 115, at 828-30.
90. Matviuw v. Johnson, 70 Ill. App. 3d 481, 486-87, 388 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1979).
91. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 68, § 115, at 835.
92. In order to prove malice, the plaintiff must show "personal spite, ill will, culpable reck-
lessness or negligence." Id. A qualified privilege exists in the law of defamation
when the communications are made in good faith without actual malice, when there are
reasonable or probable grounds for believing the communications to be true or when the
subject matter is one in which the author of the communications has an interest or in
respect to which he has a personal or public duty of either a legal, judicial, political, moral
or social nature, and the communication is made to the person having a corresponding
interest or duty.
Mayfield, 484 S.W.2d at 626. A qualified privilege may be defeated by actual malice, intentional
publication of defamatory material, publication of false defamatory material in reckless disregard for
its truth or falsity, publication to persons who have no reason to receive the information and pub-
lication with a primary purpose which is unrelated to the privileged purpose. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at
78.
93. See Murphy v. Herfort, 140 A.D.2d 415, 528 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1988).
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ilege. Such a privilege is limited to remarks made by those partic-
ipating in the peer review process, solely for the purpose of the peer
review and without any indication of malice. Although there are
limits to the availability of this immunity, most states do recognize
the importance of providing this protection.
IV. STATE ACTION
Courts have generally been unwilling to create privileges for peer
review where legislatures have failed to enact them. 94 The first statute
adopted for such protection was in Illinois in 1961. 91 The purpose
of many of the early statutes was to protect physicians from mal-
practice actions brought by patients. 96 Today, the primary purpose
is to encourage peer review in an attempt to improve the quality of
health care. 97
State legislatures have created these privileges when particular
relationships have been considered so valuable to society that it is
necessary to preserve the confidentiality of the relationship.98 Many
states have enacted statutes for the purpose of striking a balance
between the right of the physician being reviewed to be free from
defamation, and the right of the physician doing the reviewing to
be free from liability for defamation or other claims.9 These statutes
range from providing qualified immunity to providing absolute im-
munity from civil defamation actions. 00
West Virginia is in the majority of states which have granted a
conditional or qualified privilege to physicians participating in the
review process. 1 1 Indeed, this state has a series of statutes devoted
specifically to the protection of Health Care Peer Review Organi-
94. Goldberg, supra note 39, at 152.
95. Id. at 153.
96. Id.
97. See Jenkins, 102 Il. 2d 468, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984).
98. Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546, 553 (3rd Cir. 1978) (quoting Baylor v. Mading-Dugan
Drug Co., 57 F.R.D. 509, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1972)).
99. Jorstad, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review Participants for Revocation of Hospital
Staff Privileges, 28 DRaE L. REv. 692, 697 (1978-79).
100. Id. at 694.
101. W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-1 to -3 (1986).
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zations. 10 2 The actual immunity is established in section 30-3C-2 of
the West Virginia Code which provides that "no person providing
information to any review organization shall be held ... to be civilly
liable under any law unless, (1) such information is unrelated to the
performance of the duties and functions of such review organization,
or (2) such information is false ... ." The statute originally required
due care, however, an amendment in 1980 substituted "an absence
of malice" as the standard. 10 3
As in West Virginia, many states have enacted a qualified priv-
ilege for the peer review process which can be overcome by a show-
ing of malice. 04 "A frank and open discussion which is fundamental
to peer review cannot occur when the participants are concerned
about the possibility of ... lawsuits claiming malicious defama-
tion. 105 However, the immunity must be conditional or qualified
in order to afford the reviewed physician the protection from ma-
licious defamation.
In this respect, defamation actions for peer review activities are
not totally abolished. 0 6 If a physician can demonstrate malice in the
review process, he may still prevail in the defamation cause of ac-
tion. However, a recent Fourth Circuit decision recognized the strong
policy reasons behind the granting of qualified privileges to the peer
review process, and, at least impliedly, admitted that a plaintiff phy-
sician might have a difficult time establishing that malice was present
during the review. The court stated that "[i]f a conditional privilege
should ever operate, indeed if there is one instance where society
should encourage uninhibited communication, it is in the review of
the competency of medical professionals." 0 7
102. Id.
103. "A review organization or any member, agent or employee therof who, in the absence of
malice and gross negligence, acts upon or furnished counsel, services or information to a review
organization shall be immune from liability for loss or injury to the person whose activites are being
reviewed." Id.
104. Marca v. Lakefield Municipal Hosp., No. 85-C-5778 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1985) (WEsTLAw,
Allfeds)(not reported).
105. Id.
106. Feldman v. Glucroft, 522 So.2d 798 (1985).
107. Sibley, 871 F.2d at 484 (emphasis in original). There also appears to be recognition of a
conditional privilege at common law. DeLeon, 871 F.2d at 1237. Communications which arise in the
employment context or by a common interest in the subject matter are also privileged. Id. at 1238.
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The majority of states have accepted this policy argument and
have elected to provide some type of immunity for peer review. Such
legislation is essential because the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that peer review immunity is available only to the extent that
any individual state has established the immunity. 108 In Patrick v.
Burget, the Court implied that hospitals and physicians can not ex-
pect special treatment from the judicial system simply because they
are engaged in an important function in society.' 9 However, as men-
tioned earlier, the recently enacted the HCQUIA, 110 which came after
Patrick, may have provided the type of national uniformity that has
been lacking in this area of law. In fact, HCQUIA has gone a step
further in precluding this type of litigation by essentially immunizing
peer review action from liability if it is done with the reasonable
belief that it is in the furtherance of quality health care.
V. HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1986
Congress finally recognized the need to "encourag[e] good faith
professional review activities" in the medical arena."' Nationwide
concern had mounted over increasing medical malpractice actions
and the need to improve the overall quality of health care." 2 In
order to improve these national problems, it was necessary to im-
plement a system which would restrict the ability of incompetent
physicians to continue to practice and deliver poor health care.13
Congress recognized that this goal could be accomplished through
effective professional peer review, only if the threat of liability for
physicians participating in the peer review process was eliminated. 1 4
A national need existed "to provide incentives and protection for
physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.'"'s
108. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
109. Id. at 105 n.8 (Congress has insulated certain peer review activities and it is up to the state
to make further provisions.)
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52.
111. Id.
112. Id. at § 11101(1).
113. Id. at § 11101(2).
114. Id. at § 11101(4).
115. Id. at § 11101(5).
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Such were the findings that initiated the HCQUIA," 6 which was
passed to eliminate incompetent medical care and to provide a broad-
based immunity to hospitals and individuals engaging in peer review.
The Act deters the current wave of litigation regarding the granting
and denying of medical staff privileges. Its stated purpose is to
"improve the quality of medical care by encouraging physicians to
identify and discipline other physicians who are incompetent or who
engage in unprofessional behavior." '" 7 "Under this bill, hospitals
and physicians ... will be protected from damages in suits by phy-
sicians who lose their hospital privileges ....
As defined in the Act, "[pirofessional review action means an
action or recommendation of a professional review body which is
taken or made in the conduct of professional review activity, which
is based on the competence or professional conduct of an individual
physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely the health
or welfare of a patient or patients), and which affects (or may affect)
adversely the clinical privileges or membership in a professional so-
ciety of the physician." 119 Professional review activity also includes
any activity of a health care entity with respect to an individual
physician to determine whether a physician is entitled to have clinical
privileges, to determine the scope of such privileges, or to change
his privileges.120 The Act requires that considerations in the review
process not be based upon the physician's association, or lack of
association with a professional society or organization, the physi-
cian's fees or advertising practices, or "any other matter that does
not relate to the competence or professional conduct of the phy-
sician."121
Most importantly to hospitals and their staffs, the HCQUIA pro-
vides immunity from civil liability under any federal or state law
116. Id. at § 11101.
117. H.R. Rep. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, Pub. L. No. 99-660, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ArnatN. NEws 6384, 6384.
118. Id.
119. 42 U.S.C. at § 11151(9).
120. Id. at § 11151(10). Changes that adversely affect privileges include reducing, restricting,
suspending, revoking, denying or failing to renew privileges or membership in the health care entity.
Id. at § 11151(1).
121. Id. at § 11151(9)(a)-(e).
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for peer review of physicians.122 The peer review immunity for fed-
eral actions was effective on November 14, 1986.123 Immunity for
state actions became effective on October 14, 1989 if a state had
taken no legislative action precluding the immunity established by
the HCQUIA.I24 A state could choose when the immunity became
effective, and could opt-in for the immunity prior to October 14,
1989.125 State legislatures may also elect to avoid the immunity pro-
visions. 26 If no state legislative action was taken, the immunity be-
came automatic as of October 14, 1989.127
The West Virginia Legislature did not take any action on the
HCQUIA provisions, and therefore, the state immunity became ef-
fective as of October 14, 1989. In anticipation of this result, hos-
pitals around the state have amended their bylaws to meet the
standards required to receive immunity.
The immunity applies to hospitals which: 1) are licensed; 2) meet
the definition of hospitals contained in The Public Health And Wel-
fare title of the U.S. Code;' 28 3) meet due process requirements; 129
and 4) are not published in the Federal Register for failing to meet
the reporting requirements of HCQUIA.'30 If these conditions are
met then immunity is granted to the hospital, the governing body
of the hospital, the medical staff conducting the review, and any
person who participates or provides information in the review of a
physician. 31
There are also certain requirements or standards applicable to
the review process itself which must be met in order for the hospital
122. Id. at §§ 1111l(a)(1), 11151(9), 11151(10).
123. Id. at § 11111(c)(1).
124. Id.
125. Id. at § 11111(c)(2).
126. Id. at § 11111(c)(2)(B).
127. Id.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(1)-(7).
129. Public hospitals must comply with the constitutional prinicpals of due process. However,
private hospitals are not subject to the same consitutional due process requirements. See Pepple, 511
N.E.2d 467.
130. 42 U.S.C. at §§ 11111(a), 11151.
131. Id. at § 11111(b).
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to take advantage of the immunity provided by HCQUIA. In order
to receive protection the professional review must be taken
in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health
care, after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, after adequate
notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such
other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and in the
reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such
reasonable effort to obtain the facts . .. .2
Although the immunity created by the HCQUIA is fairly broad,
there are certain circumstances it will not cover. 33 Peer review im-
munity does not apply to a violation of civil rights; 134 an action by
the United States or the Attorney General, including actions brought
under the Clayton Act; 35 a situation involving false information; 36
or actions brought for injunctive or declaratory relief. 137 In addition,
those hospitals which are listed in the Federal Register for failing
to report information as required by HCQUIA will lose their peer
review immunity. 38
As a quid pro quo for the immunity, hospitals are required to
report any action taken by the hospital which "revokes or suspends
(or otherwise restricts) a physician's license or censures, reprimands,
or places on probation a physician for reasons relating to the phy-
sician's professional competence or professional conduct .... 139
A health care entity which fails to comply with these reporting re-
quirements will lose its protection.Y° If this happens, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services will publish the name of each non-
complying health care entity in the Federal Register and the im-
munity will not apply for a three-year period beginning 30 days after
the date of publication in the Federal Register. 141
132. Id. at § 11112(a)(l)-(4). The necessary standards for protections are presumed to have been
met unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at § 11112(a).
133. Id. at § 11111(a).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at § 1l1l1(a)(2).
137. Id.
138. Id. at § 11111(b).
139. Id. at § 11132(a).
140. Id. at § 11133.
141. Id.
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In addition to the reporting requirements, each hospital must also
obtain information relating to its current physicians and new phy-
sicians applying to the hospital. 142 A failure to request the appro-
priate information results in a presumption that the hospital has
knowledge of any information that has been reported concerning a
physician. 43 This may also result in negating the immunity estab-
lished for peer review. 144 A national physicians data bank has been
proposed as a clearinghouse for this information. HCQUIA au-
thorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a
national data bank to collect -and release the information relating
to the professional competence and conduct of physicians, dentists,
and other health care practitioners. 45 However, this national data
bank has not yet been put into effect. Its implementation is still
awaiting final approval by the Office of Management and Budget
at the Department of Health and Human Services. Once approval
has been granted and the proposal has been published in the Federal
Register, the national physicians data bank will become a reality and
the reporting requirements will go into effect. The target date for
the opening of the national data bank was April 1990.146
The advent of the data bank may prompt additional litigation
from rejected physicians since the effects of the reporting require-
ments to the national bank could act as a total bar from the practice
of medicine in the hospital setting of those incompetent medical
professionals. This premise is based on the theory that no accredited
hospital would want to risk hiring a doctor who has previously been
denied privileges or had his privileges revoked by another hospital.
It is also important to note that although the Act requires hospitals
to report and request certain information concerning its physicians,
there is no express provision requiring hospitals to act in accordance
with the information obtained from the data bank. However, it may
142. Id. at § 11135.
143. Id.
144. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wisc. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981) (hos-
pital presumed to have knowledge regarding physicians' qualifications and malpractice history if rea-
sonable investigation would have disclosed this information).
145. 53 Fed. Reg. 9267 (1988) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 60).
146. Telephone interviews, Dept. of Health and Human Services (Aug. 31, 1989; Jan. 23, 1990).
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seem obvious that no hospital would risk the liability associated with
having a physician with questionable qualifications on its staff. The
question then arises as to what reports a hospital may disregard or
take into consideration when hiring a new physician.
In addition to HCQUIA, in West Virginia there is a statute that
requires the reporting of information relating to the "practice or
performance of any physician .... 47According to the statute,
the chief executive officer of the hospital is to report such infor-
mation to the State Medical Board within 60 days after the hospital
privileges have been "revoked, restricted, reduced or terminated for
any cause .... 148 The report must also include any formal dis-
ciplinary action taken against a physician by the hospital regarding
"professional ethics, medical incompetence, medical malpractice,
moral turpitude or drug or alcohol abuse.' 1 49 The statute further
provides that any health care entity or review board member who
acts without malice and without gross negligence in investigating or
preparing a report while serving on such a committee is immune
from civil or criminal liability.150
In addition to the protection provided to peer review organi-
zations in a majority of the states, the provisions of the HCQUIA
go one step further in denying a state cause of action involving peer
review by the medical staff.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate purpose of the peer review process in hospitals is
to improve the quality of health care provided by the medical in-
stitutions. This is of special concern for those living in the small
communities in West Virginia. In order to achieve this increased
level of quality care, the physicians must be subjected to a height-
ened level of scrutiny. And, there can be no tolerance for the in-
competent physician.
147. W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14 (1986).
148. Id. at § 30-3-14(b).
149. Id.
150. Id. at § 30-3-14(m).
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Although this notion has not changed much through the years,
the attitude concerning the review process has been altered. Prior
to recent legislation, physicians participating in the review process
could often be caught in a very tenuous position. If they pressed
on for improving health care, physicians became the targets of lit-
igation by rejected physicians. On the other hand, if they opted to
protect their colleagues through a "code of silence", the litigation
might then be initiated by injured patients.
Legislatures have come to recognize this no-win situation and
have developed laws to protect physicians from suits arising out of
the peer review process. Undoubtedly, the law is harsh when applied
to the rejected physicians and there is no room for mistake. The
provisions of HCQUIA must not be abused as a means to discharge
disliked physicians or discriminate against any class of physicians.
Once a reputation has been tainted by the peer review process, it
is likely that a career in the hospital setting may come to an end.
Therefore, decisions must be fairly and cautiously made, and hope-
fully the ultimate result will be a society with improved medical care
quality.
It is clear that HCQUIA is designed to improve the quality of
health care. However, it is not yet evident that its provisions will
fulfill these goals. While it appears that the protection offered to
the peer review participants and the strict reporting requirements of
this Act would indeed increase quality awareness, the final outcome
will not be ascertainable until all of the provisions are actually in
effect in all states. Even without the full effect of the Act, it seems
most hospitals would not risk the liability associated with hiring a
physician with a questionable background.
When all is said and done, there is little remedy for the rejected
physician under HCQUIA in the form of defamation actions. Words
can indeed hurt.
Jacqueline Oliverio
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